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1 Normativity is everywhere, and normative talk is a central dimension of social life from
the ground level of everyday interaction to the more structured and institutionalized
domain of social cooperation. Normativity refers to our capacity to discriminate between
appropriate and non-appropriate responses to stimuli and to the capacity to critically
appraise  and  revise  the  patterns  that  regulate  those  forms  of  conduct  in  which  we
express  this  sense  of appropriateness.  But  it  refers  also  to  our  capacity  to  act  in
accordance with such appraisals, and in particular to act in ways that address directly the
normative orders which govern our lives.
2 As such,  normativity is  arguably the central  object of practical  philosophy (including
moral, political, and legal theory), and according to the received view: 
[s]omething is said by philosophers to have ‘normativity’ when it entails that some
action, attitude or mental state of some other kind is justified, an action one ought
to do or a state one ought to be in. (Darwall 2001)1
3 This definition encompasses in a classical way the main features philosophers assign to
this concept, namely justificatory concern and rational content. Normativity is concerned
with justifying (or it is that which justifies) a given course of action by referring to its
rational content. Normativity has to do with the rational content of human action and its
sources are to be found in human reason (Korsgaard 1996). From a different angle, it may
be said that normativity has to do with the constraining power of norms (Brandom 1979),
and with the accordance of actions to rules. 
4 Applying  norms,  following  rules,  or  complying  with  institutional  imperatives  have
traditionally been conceived as the normative practices which define the core area of
normativity.  This  explains why a consolidated tradition in philosophy2 has  identified
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normativity with the ‘ought,’ that is to say, with the possibility of discriminating things as
they are from things as they should be. Such discrimination is based upon the existence
of criteria – which we call ‘normative’ – to which we refer when we claim something to be
the right, legitimate, just, and appropriate way of doing things when what is at stake are
ways of treating other human beings.
5 Normativity so conceived expresses itself in normative judgements, those concerning the
appropriateness of discourses, actions, or institutions, and has, therefore, an irreducibly
epistemic dimension, that is, normative talk needs legitimation, which in turn requires
criteria for establishing the validity of normative claims. By extension, normativity deals
with the discursive activities through which agents reclaim grounds of validity for their
claims. In recent decades this mainstream idea has come under attack. Wittgensteinians
and post-Wittgesteinians, neo-pragmatists, ethical particularists, liberal realists have all,
in the various quarters of their research, put this received view on trial. These important
criticisms  notwithstanding,  central  intuitions  concerning  the  priority  of  justificatory
moves in normative theory, the possibility of uncoupling justification from application,
the priority of the discursive, the relative autonomy of the normative from the empirical,
remain tacitly accepted assumptions in philosophical ways of proceeding. Consequently,
value,  norm,  and  institution  remain  at  the  heart  of  our  way  of  thinking  about
normativity,  and  their  justification  and/or  critique  continue  to  absorb  the  best  of
philosophy’s energies.
6 In this paper I seek to challenge some of the basic assumptions which lie at the heart of
this widespread, often taken for granted, picture of what normativity is in order to let
emerge a different image of our relationship to the normative domain.3 This attempt will
require, as I intend to show, a double theoretical move. On the one hand, we need to
challenge  received  views  concerning  the  intellectual  division  of  labour  between
normative  and empirical  sciences.  In  particular,  we need to  challenge  a  view which
construes normativity through its opposition to regularity, where the first is submitted to
the logic of the ‘ought,’ while the second follows the empirical logic of facts. It is precisely
in light of this view that one may feel entitled to state that philosophy is concerned with
normativity (it states how things should be), while the social sciences are concerned with
regularity (they describe how things are). On the other hand, we need to integrate into
our  view of  normativity  more  empirical  data  about  its  mode  of  operation,  its  main
constituents, its way of functioning, the main sites where we encounter it. We should in
this sense take more seriously the theoretical consequences of what I have called “the
empirical  fact  of  normativity.”  This  will  force  us  to  part  with  the  habitual  over-
intellectualization through which normativity is usually conceived of in philosophy, that
is,  considered  as  being  mainly  a  fact  of  reason.  Philosophical  attempts  to  integrate
empirical data into theories of normativity have been scant, and generally limited to this
sui generis social  practice which is linguistic practice.  My general assumption is that
often  neglected  sociological  traditions  loosely  identifiable  as  ‘social  interactionists’
provide an account of our constitution as normative creatures which is deeply at odds
with standard philosophical accounts of normativity,  so that taking these sociological
accounts  seriously  requires  in  turn that  we radically  change our  basic  philosophical
assumptions about normativity.4
7 To counter this received philosophical view of normativity, we need to inquire into the
basic structure of ordinary experience. In particular, we need to look more carefully into
those largely tacit, and difficult to perceive, aspects composing the ‘order of interaction,’
The Normative Structure of the Ordinary
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-1 | 2015
2
and it is with reference to this dimension of social life that I intend to speak of a normative
structure of the ordinary. To uncover this neglected dimension of normativity, we can rely
upon those sociological and philosophical traditions which, more than any other, have
explored  the  normative  resources  of  ordinary  experience.  These  traditions  –  among
which I  will  single  out  ethnomethodology,  the philosophy of  ordinary language,  and
pragmatism5 –  have fashioned an image of  human beings as normative creatures,  an
image which, if taken seriously, radically alters our most consolidated ideas about what
normativity is and how it functions. This is, at any rate, the conclusion I intend to defend
in  this  paper.  The  paper  is  divided  into  three  parts.  In  the  first  I  introduce
ethnomethodology and Goffman’s sociology and discuss their implications for the study
of normativity. In the second I connect the findings of this sociological tradition with
some  implications  of  Austin’s  philosophy  of  ordinary  language.  Finally,  in  the  third
section I will contend that the pragmatist conception of normativity takes these empirical
evidences adequately into account. Overall, my argument is that, while the sociological
tradition of social interactionism shed new light on the “empirical fact of normativity,”
ordinary language philosophy and pragmatism offer a theoretical account of normativity
which is consistent with the picture of normativity which emerges from these empirical
descriptions.
 
Normativity and the Constitutive Order of Everyday
Interactions
8 In the second half of the 20th century, an entire array of sociological approaches – in the
forefront  of  which  stand  symbolic  interactionism,  ethnomethodology,  conversation
analysis,  and  the  work  of  Ervin  Goffman –  have  focused  upon a  till  then  neglected
dimension of social reality, that of everyday forms of social interaction. Some of these
works have gone to considerable lengths to explore the ordinary texture of social life, and
in claiming social interaction to be its basic structure, it becomes the location at which
the  social  bond is  engendered and maintained,  the  space  at  which social  order  and
cooperation are realized. If one takes this sociological view seriously, one is compelled to
assume, at least hypothetically, that this dimension of social life has a decisive connection
with what philosophers term ‘normativity.’ If, indeed, normativity has to do with how
human beings orient their life and regulate their reciprocal interactions, and if the basis
of social life has to be discovered in this neglected and “noticed but unseen” order of
interaction, then it seems plausible to inquire into the normative implications of a view of
society  that  claims  the  priority  of  the  constitutive  or  interaction  order  over  the
“aggregative  order”  governed  by  the  better  known  play  of  norms,  values,  and
institutions.6 In this rich and complex sociological panorama, the works of Goffman and
Harold Garfinkel stand out as the most compelling and it is to them that I now turn.
 
Ethnomethodology and the Priority of the Social Order of Interaction
9 Ethnomethodology  has  probably  provided  one,  if  not  the  most,  interesting  and
empirically  compelling  series  of  arguments  in  support  of  a  distributed  and  all-
encompassing  conception  of  normativity.  The  novelty  of  the  ethnomethodological
revolution  consists  in  having  shown,  in  surprising  discontinuities  with  previous
sociological traditions, that the successful continuance of social life is not granted merely
The Normative Structure of the Ordinary
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-1 | 2015
3
by the existence of  shared values,  norms,  institutions,  or  attitudes,  nor by the mere
operating of social steering systems, but that it relies upon the incessant renewal of social
order through the active and passive normative engagement of social members within
the everyday ordinary interactions which structure our interpersonal intercourse. In so
doing, ethnomethodology has challenged the most pervasive conception of social order as
based upon collective  orientations,  of  which paradigmatic  examples  can be  found in
Durkheim’s idea of collective mentality as a shared set of normative expectations capable
of  granting  social  coordination.  Contrary  to  mainstream  sociological  traditions,
ethnomethodologists have shown that the ordered continuation of social life is achieved
through the “ongoing accomplishment of the concerted activities of daily life” (Garfinkel
1967:  vii).  As such,  it  relies upon constantly renewed and continuously accomplished
normative  interactions  aimed  at  confirming  and  adjusting  our  reciprocal  normative
expectations, and that only seldom take the shape of explicit and discursive acts. The
point  illustrated  by  ethnomethodology  is  that,  without  this  active  normative
engagement,  the  social  world  simply  falls  apart  and  no  collective  undertaking  can
succeed.  Ethnomethodologists  have consequently  insisted that  normativity  cannot  be
adequately grasped by the uncoupling and articulating of the justification of norms and
their subsequent application,7 but that it relies upon the ongoing micro, often tacit and
constantly  produced,  doing and undoing of  normative acts  that  confirm,  adjust,  and
repair the fragile net of our normative expectations. 
10 Garfinkel’s “breaching experiments” (Garfinkel 1967: esp. Chaps. 1 and 2) have shown
beyond reasonable doubt not only that our ordinary life is structured by an implicit range
of  normative expectations,  but  that  normativity  is  also constantly  produced through
active,  albeit  often tacit,  normative actions accomplished by social  members,  such as
those accomplished by social actors standing in line waiting for their turn to be served.
According to Garfinkel (1967: 22): 
[…]  a  society’s  members  encounter  and  know  the  moral  order  as  perceivedly
normal courses of action – familiar scenes of everyday affairs, the world of daily life
known in common with others and with others taken for granted. 
11 The naturalness of these courses of action is itself an achievement of social interaction,
something that social members generate by orienting their own and others’ actions in
accordance with their normative expectations.  These actions,  which take the form of
turns  in  either  conversational  or  action-based  exchanges,  often  remain  beneath  the
threshold of our perceptive attention, constituting what Garfinkel describes as the “seen
but unnoticed” background upon which social life plays out. Among these actions stand a
vast array of normative practices through which actors confirm or disconfirm, correct
and amend, reinforce or downplay what is being advanced by their interlocutors. This
“seen but unnoticed” background is not made up of stable values, norms or expectations,
but of knowledge concerning the proper way of engaging in social interactions, and it
consists of a plurality of ways of doing through which the mutual engagement of social
members is kept on the track of ‘proper’ interaction. 
12 According to Garfinkel, social order must be necessarily worked out in its details at the
level  of  local  interaction because  normative  orders  are  structurally  and unavoidably
under-determined.8 Hence the possibility of engaging successfully in a social interaction
reposes upon our capacity to interpret the other’s reaction with reference to the assumed
regularity of a shared system of “perceived normal values” (Garfinkel 1967: 94) which
enable us to fill the gaps produced by the indexical structure of social life. As Garfinkel
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constantly reminds us, these “perceived normal values” are not assumed by members
once and for all, but are constantly produced and reproduced – Garfinkel says “managed”
–  in  the  course  of  the  social  interaction  itself.  The  performative  efficacy  of  our
assumptions  depends,  then.  upon its  constant  confirmation  through the  feedback  of
others. It is not assumed but rather constructed and entertained through the give and
take of sequential turns within a social interaction. In other words, the very possibility of
social interaction relies upon: “the enforceable character of actions in compliance with
the expectancies of everyday life as a morality” (Garfinkel 1967: 53). 
13 The order of interaction is then characterized by three distinctive features. The first is
that social interaction heavily depends upon this duty to comply with expectations. The
second feature is that this order is not given or found, but constantly produced through
the  interaction  itself. The  third  feature  is  that  these  expectations  find  only  weak
transcendent guarantees outside the social situation itself. Indeed, it is a central thesis of
social  interactionist  approaches that the interaction order does not find independent
guarantee in some transcendent institution, but relies upon nothing more than ‘what
everyone knows.’ Taken together, these three features concur to define the distinctive
normative  quality  of  the  order  of  interaction,  which  is  to  say  its  structural  fragility. 
Depending upon members’ willingness to comply; being exposed to the inappropriateness
of  members’  actions  and  lacking  any  independent  normative  source,  the  order  of
interaction is constantly exposed to the threat of its failure. This fact may explain why
participation imposes upon all  participants the duty of taking care of it,  not only by
complying with expectations, but also by forcing others to do so. These empirical facts
render even the simplest settings of social life, such as standing in a queue or exchanging
greetings with strangers in the street, literally imbued with normativity.
14 These empirical facts have, therefore, decisive implications for a theory of normativity. In
fact, ethnomethodological findings show that, in taking decisions, society’s members do
not act as if they were following rules or applying previously agreed or shared systems of
norms. On the contrary, detailed empirical studies of the normative logic of interaction
orders  show  that  the  appropriateness  of  a  normative  order  is  something  which  is
contextually  decided  according  to  the  needs  of  the  situation.  Whereas  in  post-hoc
explanations  actors  tend to  describe  their  behavior  according  to  a  rule-following or
norm-application model, ethnographic observation shows that, in reality, their decisions
follow a different dynamic, as they are heavily dependent upon interactional sequences
which define the social situation. A member of society will normally tend to take their
decisions not according to a pre-ordained set of norms and values, but according to their
actual (i.e. in that particular phase of the ongoing situation) understanding of what are
the: “normatively valued social structures which the subject accept[s] as conditions that his
decisions […] had to satisfy” (Garfinkel 1967: 93). What the subject takes for accepted
conditions is indeed the outcome of the interaction itself and depends upon a textured
web of expectations,  upon the capacity of members to adequately interpret the signs
produced by other members,  upon the reliability of their presuppositions concerning
others’  intentions  and  epistemic  states.  Interestingly  enough,  members’  interpretive
strategies tend in most cases to operate so as to confirm standard expectations and to
preserve the conditions upon which the social interaction can be successfully pursued.
The order of interaction is autonomous in the sense that, within it, subjects do not act
according to pre-given normative orientations, but tend rather to adjust their normative
orientation to  their  perception of  what  the situation requires.  The point  is  that  the
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successful  pursuit  of  the  normative  interaction  imposes  upon  society’s  members
constraints concerning their normative orientations. If we take the ethnomethodological
lesson seriously, it becomes impossible to explain away the normative implications of
these constraints in terms of “social influence” or “weakness of the will.” The point is,
rather, that the kind of normative work which is being done within the interaction order
is simply not accountable in terms of rule-following, norm-application, or institutional
compliance.  Indeed,  the  indexical  dependence  revealed  by  ethnomethodological
enquiries is a necessary condition of the successful furtherance of social life, its social-
structural presupposition or, as I call it, the normative structure of the ordinary.
 
Ervin Goffman and “Face Work” as a Normative Practice
15 A second take on the idea of  human beings as  normative creatures can be found in
Goffman’s study of the normative order of social interaction.9 Goffman’s entire sociology
takes on the challenge that the deepest dynamics of social life – and of normativity with it
– can be disclosed to us provided we turn our attention to: “the little interactions that are
forgotten about as soon as they occur, into what serious students of society never collect,
into the slop of social life” (Goffman 1971: 138). Goffman has written that: “the main
principle of the ritual order is not justice but face” (1967: 44). By this, I take him to mean
that  the  preservation and constant  maintenance of  normative  orders  is  the  primary
normative concern within human interaction, that saving the face of the other so as to
bring the present interaction to fulfillment, rather than abstract compliance with norms,
is the regulative standard to which our normative interactions are attuned.
16 For Goffman, normative social orders rely upon the constant and successful achievement
of everyday micro normative practices through which agents take responsibility not only
for their ‘face’ but also for that of other agents by constantly correcting, sanctioning,
criticizing,  approving  others’  behaviors  which  impinge  upon  the  stability  of  social
interaction. The point of Goffman’s analysis that is relevant for my understanding of
normativity  is  the  idea  that  a  mutual  engagement is  needed  for  the  preservation  of
normative  orders.  On  the  one  hand,  each  agent  is  engaged  in  what  Goffman  calls
“defensive strategies,” through which they protect their face from potentially disruptive
social situations. On the other, each agent is equally engaged, through what Goffman calls
“protective strategies,” in helping others to save their own face. What Goffman terms
“Face  work,”  to  this  extent,  is  not  a  self-centered  and  defensive  procedure,  but  a
cooperative task. Since their very start, social orders presuppose and rely upon mutual
normative interactions because in any social intercourse each agent exposes their face,
but depends upon others for its defense. 
17 The mutuality of normative engagements seems to stem from this very basic fact of social
life that acquires, therefore, a primary meaning. As Goffman remarks: “when the person
commits a gaffe against himself, it is not he who has the license to forgive the event; only
the others have that prerogative” (Goffman 1967: 33). This determines the fact that social
life is built upon “a system of checks and balances” that can operate only on the basis of
strict cooperation, as each participant relies and depends upon others to preserve his
own face and has in turn responsibility for the face of others. Indeed: 
[…] it seems to be a characteristic obligation of many social relationships that each
of the members guarantees to support a given face for the other members in given
situations. (Goffman 1967: 42)
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18 This is, for instance, the social work accomplished by a peculiar normative practice that
Goffman calls “cooling the mark out” (Goffman 1952), a practice by which a social actor
who has constructed “a conception of himself which cannot be sustained” needs to be
“cooled  out,”  which  is  to  say  helped  to  save  their  face  and  escape  the  socially
unsustainable situation in which they have fallen (or been thrown). Goffman shows that,
in circumstances in which an agent happens to have “defined himself in a way which the
social facts come to contradict,” it is only through the help of another social actor that
they will be able to find their way out.
The mark must therefore be supplied with a new set of apologies for himself, a new
framework in which to see himself and judge himself. A process of redefining the
self  along defensible lines must be instigated and carried along;  since the mark
himself  is  frequently  in  too  weakened  a  condition  to  do  this,  the  cooler  must
initially do it for him. (Goffman 1952: 456)
19 This social function is so important that society has institutionalized it in professional
roles such as psychotherapists, while institutions have been created to host those who
have definitively lost face (asylums, ‘hobo jungles,’ old people’s homes, etc. – see Goffman
1952: 463).
20 This mutual dependence, which is constitutive of social life and defines the rough ground
of  normativity,  entails  “involvement  obligations,”  since  the  preservation  of  the
normative order on which social life relies depends upon each member’s complying with
these normative expectations. As a consequence:
[…] when the individual intentionally or unintentionally breaks a rule of etiquette,
others present may mobilize themselves to restore the ceremonial order, somewhat
as they do when other types of social order are transgressed. (Goffman 1967: 114)10
21 Starting  from its  roots,  social  life  presupposes,  and  can  exist  only,  as  long  as  each
participant accepts the role of a critical controller with regard to the behavior of each
agent in the face of tacitly shared normative assumptions: “the individual must not only
maintain  proper  involvement  himself  but  also  act  so  as  to  ensure  that  others  will
maintain  theirs”  (Goffman  1967:  116).  These  attitudes  of  mutual  involvement  that
Goffman calls  ‘face  work’  seem, therefore,  to  provide  the  most  general  paradigm of
human attitudes towards normative orders.11
22 Another aspect of the normative structure of the ordinary which emerges from Goffman’s
work concerns the centrality of the reparative dimension of normativity.  As Goffman
remarks,  whereas in the case of  the macro social  order punishment seems to be the
overarching goal of normative devices, in the case of the interaction order the concern to
restore a smooth interaction overrides that for normative attribution and punishment: 
Since the guilt is small and the punishment smaller, there often will be less concern
–  and admittedly  so  –  to  achieve  proper  attribution than to  get  traffic  moving
again.” (Goffman 1971: 108)
23 The  ritual  work  described  allows  the  participants  to  go  on  their  way,  if  not  with
satisfaction that matters are closed, then at least with the right to act as if they feel that
matters  are  closed  and  that  ritual  equilibrium has  been  restored.  If  any  discontent
remains within either party, presumably it will have to be expressed or exhibited at some
other time. In other words, after the ritual work, the incident can be treated as though it
were closed. “So the ‘round’ that has occurred is also a complete interchange” (Goffman
1971: 140). Ordinary social life is densely textured by moves aimed at anticipating (and
excusing) possible violations of the standard order of interaction (excuses, apologies) and
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at  accounting  ex  post  for  offenses.  If  public  life  can  go  on  successfully  and  social
interaction does not breakdown, it is thanks to such interaction. The order of interaction
is a normative order at least as important as the macro social order made up of values,
norms, and institutions. Without the constant intervention of these remedial activities,
social life would fall into chaos.
24 The normative implications associated with this stated priority of the order of interaction
are quite striking: 
When a robbery is committed, no innocent party is likely to volunteer himself as
the culprit; when an interactional offense occurs, everyone directly involved may
be ready to assume guilt and to offer reparation. (Goffman 1971: 108)
25 As a consequence: 
[…]  in  the  realm of  public  order  it  is  not  obedience  and  disobedience  that  are
central, but occasions that give rise to remedial work of various kinds. (Goffman
1971: 108)
26 What Goffman terms “remedial work” consists of forms of apology or account through
which a putatively offending agent restores the broken interaction, either by assuming
responsibility  for  the  deed or  explaining why he  did what  he  did.  In  both cases,  as
Goffman  explains,  the  normative  standard  of  the  interaction  does  not  seem  to  be
adequacy  or  truth  but  efficacy  in  accomplishing  a  ritual  exchange  whose  goal  is  to
preserve the face of the participants so as to enable the interaction to continue:
A remedial interchange, then, includes all the moves taken in regard to a virtual
offense,  and  these  usually,  but  not  inevitably,  will  leave  the  participants  in  a
position to act as if the issue can be dropped. (Goffman 1971: 120)
27 Throughout  these  passages,  Goffman emphasizes  a  distinctive  feature  of  most  social
interactionist approaches, which is to say their insistence upon the relative autonomy of
social  interaction  as  having  its  end  in  itself.  Differently  put,  social  interactions  are
undertaken for their own sake and follow a logic that can be purely immanent. Hence the
replacement of justice – an external normative standard – with face as a purely immanent
normative criteria.
28 Ethnomethodologists, conversational analysts, as well as Goffman (and Goffmanians) have
extensively studied how a normative order can emerge and be preserved out of face-to-
face ordinary interactions in apparently irrelevant situations such as standing in a queue,
meeting in an lift, exchanging words in a floor shop, and so on (Goffman 1983). They have
shown that these social practices rely upon an intrinsic logic of organization, as members
make a commitment to the orderliness of that practice which is independent of other
external  considerations.  One  of  the  overarching  and  possibly  most  interesting
achievements of this sociological tradition consists in having singled out for empirical
description a dimension of social normativity not directly ascribable to the functioning of
formal institutions and norms. Under the expressions of constitutive practices (Garfinkel)
and  the  interaction  order  (Goffman),  these  authors  have  shown  that  the  successful
furtherance of social order relies upon two distinct normative phenomena. On the one
hand, there is the well-known and much studied normative order of explicit norms and
institutions,  whose  main  logic  can  be  described  in  terms  of  rule-following,  norm
application, and institutional compliance. At this level, social order can be analyzed in
terms of an agent’s compliance with a normative order that is publicly and explicitly
embodied  in  norms,  values,  and  institutions.  On  the  other  hand,  ethnomethodology
contends that social interaction is characterized by a specific form of normative order
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which does not rely upon pre-existing, transcendent norms and institutions that agents
are merely expected to apply or comply with, but which is deeply situational. 
29 As I have shown, through empirical accounts of the interaction order provided by social
interactionists,  three  conditions  emerge  as  the  defining  features  of  the  normative
structure  of  the  ordinary:  (a)  its  irreducible  and  constitutive  indexicality,  (b)  the
mutuality of engagements as a basic feature of our normative commitments, and (c) the
pervasiveness of reparative kinds of normative practices. Taken together, they account
for  the  specific  normative  mix  of  immanence,  fragility,  and  objectivity  which
characterizes it.
30 To recapitulate briefly: at (a), the normative order of interaction displays forms of social
relation in which social  intercourse is  not  ruled by shared agreements about values,
norms,  and  institutions.  Commitment  to  the  enabling  conventions  of  interaction  is
something that cannot be explained neither in terms of a radical situationism nor in
those of a structural determination of action. Anne Rawls has notably insisted upon this
feature of social interactionism, claiming that these sociologies have shown indexicality
to be a constitutive and necessary condition of the maintenance of social life. Indeed,
“indexicality addresses the need for commitment and reciprocity in social situations”
(Rawls 1989: 162), because: “it is through the very indexicality of the talk that it becomes
possible to establish and verify mutual understanding” (Rawls 1989: 162). Because taking
turns in a social interaction presupposes having attended previous turns, this obliges
participants to pay attention to the interaction and to remain involved in it.  In this
perspective, indexicality maximizes: “the necessary commitment to the conversational
order  itself  because they can only be understood if  strict  attention to  sequencing is
achieved” (Rawls 1989: 163). Hence Rawls concludes that: 
The ironic result of this position is that potential ambiguity (“indexicality”), which
philosophers have assumed must be eliminated to achieve understanding, is not
only  a  recurrent  feature  of  ordinary  conversation  but  ,  according  to  Sacks,
conversationalists appear to maximize their use of indexicals. Instead of viewing
this as irrational behavior, he argued that the maximization of indexicality might
be the solution to problems of meaning and in fact one of the keys to social order.
[…] He argues that conversationalists maximize the potential for ambiguity at each
next instant so that participants will need more closely to commit themselves to
the ground rules of interaction. (Rawls 1989: 164-165) 
31 She continues: 
Their interactional achievement requires a commitment to a degree of reciprocity
of perspectives among participants in an interaction that in turn demands that
specific sets of institutionalized values be at least partially set aside for the time
being. Because the principles of organization are viewed as responses to the needs
of self and discourse, they have no particular content, i.e., they have no objective
beyond  achieving  interaction.  They  are  not  aimed  at  achieving  external  goals,
maximizing efficiency, class interests, etc. One’s commitment is to the discourse, to
the achievement of sociality. (Rawls 1989: 166) 
32 At  (b),  for  both  Garfinkel  and  Goffman,  interdependence,  reciprocity,  mutual
commitments are all names given to the basic fact of social life, which is the interactional
interdependence of social actors as the anthropological condition on which social life is
built. Seen from the perspective of the order of interaction, the social bond relies upon
this  fact  of  mutual  dependence.  This  lack  of  autonomy  in  the  construction  and
preservation  of  the  self  appears  as  the  building  block  of  social  life.  This  moral
commitment  defines  the  normative  structure  of  the  ordinary  as  a  form  of  joint
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responsibility which can be decomposed into two dimensions which need to be kept
distinct and separate. On the one hand, reciprocal responsibility of social actors as the
‘face’ of each of them depends upon the willingness of the other to save it. On the other
hand, each social actor’s responsibility for the social order, as the fragility of the order of
interaction, requires the constant involvement of social agents with it. 
33 These forms of interdependence may be described in terms of a relation of ‘care.’ On the
one hand, the face of the other needs to be taken care of because its preservation can be
achieved only as  a  result  of  a  shared commitment.  On the other hand,  the order of
interaction needs to be taken care of because it is punctuated by incessant normative
conflicts concerning the shared definition of the situation that is needed to successfully
manage the interaction.
34 At (c), the phenomenology of the normative structure of the ordinary shows that the
philosophical concern with justification and critique is out of tune with how social life
functions. The empirical evidence uncovered by social interactionists shows that the ‐
most widely shared normative practices stem from a concern for maintaining, repairing,
adjusting, ‘taking care of’ normative orders. The order of interaction is a normative order
constantly exposed to the danger of its breach, constantly open to the contestation of its
participants’ definition, and constantly subject to the uncertainty of events. And at the
same time, its preservation, which is necessary both for the constitution of the self’s
identity as well as for the ordered pursuit of social goals, relies upon the careful attention
those involved in the relation devote to it, upon their responsiveness to the need for
constant adjustment, upon their ability to perform reparative actions, upon the capacity
to reframe the situation or acceptance of  the re-framing of  others.  Care,  reparation,
maintenance, appear in this light to be the basic normative concerns upon which social
life relies. 
35 These three features describe an order of normativity which diverges in its inner logic
from that which dominates what sociologists call the institutional order whereby explicit
commitment to shared norms, values, and institutions organize social life. On the one
hand, this normative order is characterized by an extreme fragility, which in its turn
imposes upon participants an involvement obligation. The order of interaction needs to
be taken care of because it is punctuated by incessant normative conflicts concerning the
shared definition of the situation that is needed to successfully manage the interaction. It
is a normative order constantly exposed to the threat of its breach, constantly open to the
contestation of the definition to be adopted by the participants, and caught in the grip of
the uncertainty of events. And at the same time, its preservation is necessary both for the
constitution  of  the  self’s  identity  and  for  the  ordered  pursuit  of  social  goals.  Its
preservation  relies  upon  careful  attention  those  involved  devote  to  it,  upon  their
responsiveness  to  the  need  for  constant  adjustment,  upon  their  ability  to  perform
reparative actions, upon the capacity to re-frame the situation or accept the re-framing
performed by others. Care, reparation, maintenance appear in this light to be the basic
normative concerns upon which social life relies. On the other hand, while contextually
dependent upon locally determined social interactions, this normative order is at the
same  time  grounded  in  the  objective  structure  of  these  same  interactions  because
interactional constraints are not purely situational but,  on the contrary,  they display
regularities.  Its grounds of objectivity differ,  however, from those of the institutional
order. Indeed, at the level of the interaction order there are no external means of social
control, no shared normative institutions, no explicit norms and values upon which it can
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rely. Its situational constraints are of a different kind. Seen as a constitutive order of
interaction, social order is mainly described as a form of self-regulating practice, whose
regulative  criteria  tend  to  be  embedded  in  the  practice  itself,  governed  by  the
overarching goal of its successful accomplishment, tacit rather than explicit, and heavily
underspecified  and  context-dependent.  According  to  this  view,  social  order  is  not
imposed upon social  reality  top-down,  but  rather  emerges  bottom-up through social
interaction,  as  a  property  of  social  interactions  themselves.  Hence  its  fragility.  The
normative order of social life reposes,  therefore, in the mutual engagements through
which actors constantly negotiate their social positions, coordinate their action, define
and redefine their selves, as well as the social situations in which they act. According to
this conception of social life, the standard view of normativity as being mainly concerned
with rule-following,  norm-application,  and institutional-compliance  loses  much of  its
relevance.
36 Although  neither  Garfinkel  nor  Goffman  have  developed  a  full-blown  account  of
normativity,  their  empirical  analysis  of  social  life  clearly  points  beyond  standard
philosophical  accounts,  and  call  for  a  different,  practice-based,  and  society-centered
account of normativity. These sociological enquiries into elementary forms of social order
are of major philosophical importance for scholars interested in normative questions. If,
in fact, our normative constitution is first and foremost defined by the priority of orders
of interaction and of mutual accountability, what does this social fact tell us about the
nature of normativity? Is the mainstream paradigm of rule-following, norm-application,
and institutional compliance adequate to account for the normative texture of ordinary
life? My claim is that it is not, and that in order to adequately account for the ordinary
structure of normativity, we need a different philosophical theory of normativity, one
that  takes  into  fuller  account  the  practice-based  and  society-centered  structure  of
experience.  As  I  intend to  show,  pragmatism possesses  the  theoretical  resources  for
developing  such  a  philosophical  conception  of  normativity.12 I  suggest  that  we  see
pragmatism as having developed a theoretical account of normativity consistent with the
account of social reality developed by the tradition of social interactionism.
37 But before introducing pragmatism, there follows a short detour through the normative
implications  of  ordinary  language  philosophy  which  provides  a  useful  conceptual
intermediate step between the sociological explorations evoked above and the theoretical
reflections developed henceforward. 
 
The Normative Power of the Ordinary
38 Ordinary language philosophy is another topical place where decisive aspects relating to
the  normative  structure  of  the  ordinary  have  been  uncovered.  More  than  in
Wittgenstein’s  remarks  on language games and forms of  life,  it  is,  however,  in  John
Austin’s linguistic pragmatics that we find the most interesting contributions to such a
theory. In several places Austin has contested received views of normativity, stigmatizing
the philosophical overemphasis upon justification (Austin 1956: 126) and pointing out the
normative importance of everyday practices such as excuses. Austin’s work has decisively
contributed to the displacement of three of the most persistent fetishes of philosophy –
truth, assertion, and justification. By relocating truth within a larger theory of linguistic
validity  based upon the concept  of  felicity,  by relativizing the assertoric  function of
language, and by inscribing justification within a larger view of what normative practices
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are,  Austin  not  only  changes  our  view of  language,  but  more  radically  our  view of
normativity, in several ways introducing the dimension of the ordinary into the heart of
philosophy.
39 Austin’s studies of the multiple ways in which communication can fail,  giving way to
“infelicitous” acts (Austin 1962: lects. 1 & 2), reveal the fragility of ordinary interactions in
ways  that  clearly  resonate  with  Garfinkel  and  Goffman’s  analysis  of  the  order  of
interaction. By pointing to the several ways in which communication can fail,  Austin
shows  that  “the  natural  successful  act”  (Austin  1956:  128)  relies  upon an  extremely
delicate equilibrium. Breakdowns, misfires, infelicities, clumsiness, abuses are but some
of  the  terms  employed by  Austin  to  indicate  how social  interaction can ‘go  wrong,’
pointing, therefore, to the extraordinary importance and the astonishing pervasiveness
of the reparatory dimension of normativity. The ordinary has a normative structure and
normativity has an ordinary structure precisely because the successful pursuit of social
life  relies  upon constant  engagement  in  normative  practices  aimed at  repairing  and
adjusting the fragile texture of everyday interactions. 
40 One may be tempted to reduce Austin’s interest in failure as a methodological strategy to
explore normality through a via negativa.  This interpretation, somehow legitimated by
Austin himself (see in particular Austin 1956: 132), does not, however, deliver the full
import  of  the  OLP  approach  to  the  study  of  normativity.  To  fully appreciate  the
philosophical relevance of Austin’s analysis of failure for a theory of normativity, one
should rather recognize that his enquiries into the dark side of linguistic interactions are
driven by a genuine interest in the fragility of the social bond. The relevance of failure
does not consist merely in its, so to speak, ancillary contribution to unveiling the logic of
successful interaction. Rather, failures are a legitimate object of philosophical inquiry in
their own right because they point to the vulnerability of the ordinary13 and to its central
place  in  the  normative  structure  of  the  ordinary.  If  we  accept  that  “J. L.  Austin’s
philosophy of ordinary language is founded on failures in linguistic acts” (Laugier 2012:
339), we come closer to perceiving in what sense the core of normativity for Austin lies in
practices of maintenance and reparation of our normative commitment and undertaking,
rather than on practices of assertion, justification, or critique.
41 The basic structure of normativity is revealed by failure because failure reveals in turn
the structural vulnerability of the social order of interaction. It is because our normative
commitments are fragile, fallible, and continuously exposed to failure that we need to pay
constant attention to them, to invest huge amounts of energy in repairing the webs of our
normative commitments. As normative creatures, we seem to be involved much more in
reparation,  maintenance,  and adjustment  than in  justification or  critique  of  existing
orders. Not only do infelicities, excuses, and other cases of failure show the fragility of
our normative undertaking, but they also show that the successful achievement of social
order does not rely upon the repetitive application of norms that have been fixed once
and for all. On the contrary, and in astonishing continuity with the sociological teaching
of social interactionists, it rather reposes upon locally enacted practices of normative
reparation and maintenance. 
42 Notably, it is excuses that reveal the ever-present necessity of repairing the normative
web  of  the  ordinary  every  time  it  is  broken  by  our  infelicitous  linguistic  (or  non-
linguistic) acts. It is because the possibility of failure and infelicity are ever-present as a
constitutive possibility of our normative engagements that, according to Austin, excuses,
rather  than  justifications  reveal  the  basic  structure  of  normativity.  More  than  in
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justifying, or in criticizing, it  is in pleading for excuses that we reveal our nature as
normative creatures. The incredibly rich variety of excuses reveals the incredibly rich
variety of ways in which our normative engagements can falter, and in that way it reveals
the extremely vast and complex array of reparative and maintenance practices which are
required in order to make social order possible and effective. It is the vulnerability of the
social order, rather than that of the individual personality, that is relevant here. The
constant and ever- present possibility of failure evokes the responsibility of social actors
for the success of social interactions. It is because we are always on the verge of failing
our normative practices that we should, as normative agents, be constantly involved in
the process of actively taking care of them. It is not the application or the following of the
norm that define the basic structure of normativity, but rather its constant adjustment
and  reparation.  The  reference  to  adjustment  and  maintenance  implicitly  evokes  the
irreducibly social dimension of normative practices. It is always with reference to a social
context,  to  the  anticipation of  the  possible  answer  of  my interlocutor,  to  the  inter-
subjective  dimension  which  constitutes  normativity,  that  a  linguistic  –  and  a  non-
linguistic – act may be felicitous or infelicitous.
43 It  is  this  element  of  mutual  responsibility  and  active  and  reciprocal  normative
engagement that emerges at the heart of our normative constitution.
 
Pragmatism and the Project of a Society-Centered and
Practice-Based Conception of Normativity
44 Affinities  between interactionist sociologies  and  pragmatism has  often  been noticed,
although the discussion has mostly been confined to the theory of  action and social
theory. In this part of the paper I will not be concerned with direct influences between
these movements or with real affinities.14 I will rather try to follow at some length the
hypothesis  that  some  general  intuitions  about  normativity  developed  within  the
pragmatist tradition are not only consistent with the view of social life developed by
interactionist  sociologies,  but,  more  radically,  that  a  pragmatist-based  conception  of
normativity provides the philosophical account most consistent with the view of social
life which emerges out of these sociological approaches.
45 Pragmatists, starting at least from Peirce and Dewey, have emphasized the continuity
between  the  tacit  and  non-tacit  dimensions  of  experience,  and  have  explored  the
naturalistic and social grounds of normativity. For Dewey ‘morality is social,’  and our
normative stance is rooted in our natural and social constitution. In addition, pragmatism
suggests that we understand the sources of normativity as lying within social experience,
in  the  ongoing  and  context-bound  struggles  within problematic  situations.  Another
distinctive feature of pragmatism is that it conceives of normative sources as fallible and
experimental:  arguments  and  experiences  to  be  mobilized  within  contextualized
processes  of  enquiry.  According  to  this  view,  normative  sources  do  not  possess  any
intrinsic normative force. They are merely potential bases for action, whose validity must
be established by those involved in the problematic situation at hand. Whilst pragmatist
philosophers  certainly  did  not  achieve  the  sociological  finesse  involved  in
ethnomethodology’s  descriptions  of  social  reality,  Dewey’s  conception  of  the
transactional nature of social life provides a valid theoretical framework for these and
similar empirical researches.
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46 My intended reading of a pragmatist approach to normativity may appear to be at odds,
or  at  least  at  variance,  with  the  interpretation  of  pragmatism  which  has  been
predominant in the last two decades. It has indeed become customary to identify the
pragmatist approach to normativity with its conception of habits, often coupled with a
theory of  creativity.15 In this now standard approach,  normativity is  understood as a
chapter in the theory of action. Although this approach deserves all the interest it has
received, it does not appear to be the best place to start if one wishes to account for facts
about normativity highlighted in the previous sections. There is, however, another lesson
we can draw from the pragmatist tradition from Peirce to Robert Brandom. This lesson,
while not contradicting the previous one, adds further elements as it emphasizes the
practice-based and society-centered structure of normativity. In Dewey’s terms, it states
that the structure of our normative commitments is irreducibly transactional. It not only
rooted in the social context which constitutes the action-situation, but also constituted
through  face-to-face  interaction  and  the  transactional  relationship  integrating  the
organismic agent and their social and natural environment. In Mead’s terms, it states that
the basis of social life is provided by the social interaction through which the self  is
constituted.  Contemporary  pragmatist  scholars  as  diverse  as  Brandom and Frederick
L. Will  have further articulated these basic  intuitions,  taking this  seminal  pragmatist
intuition about normativity a step further. It is to these last two contributions which I
now turn.
 
The Inferential Texture of Social Normativity
47 The first pragmatist take on normativity I propose to consider may surprise the reader, as
it  implies  a  privilege of  the linguistic  dimension which is,  frankly,  at  odds  with the
practice-based programme developed so far. I refer to Robert Brandom’s conception of
normativity,  and  in  particular  to  his  idea  of  reasons  as  inferentially  articulated
commitments, and of action as receiving its intelligibility from the inferential network of
reasons through which we account for it. As is known, Brandom’s whole conception of
language relies upon a normative fact, that is to say the normative fact of commitment.
However, Brandom sees normativity as a basic and irreducible dimension of the human
constitution, and this explains the relevance of his approach for what is pursued here. His
whole  semantic  theory  is  built  upon  the  intuition  that,  if  the  meaning  of  doxastic
commitments  in  general16 derives  from  their  deontic  status  within  discourse,  then
normativity  is  implied  in  the  basic  structure  of  meaning  and  language.  If  we  take
Brandom’s normative semantic seriously, its main normative implication is that the very
possibility  of  mutual  understanding  –  and  therefore  of  the  social  intercourse  that
communication makes possible – depends upon the human capacity to endorse normative
commitments.  Indeed,  the  possibility  of  meaningful  expression  relies  upon  what
Brandom calls ‘scorekeeping,’ which is the capacity to be accountable and to assume that
others are accountable for the inferential implications of what they say. 
48 Relationality and interaction are then built into the basic fabric of social life in a double
sense. To begin with, as inference is in itself dynamic and relational. As is known, an
inferential semantic is a semantic that defines terms through their relations to other
terms which are logically related to them by way of what Brandom terms ‘commitments
and entitlements.’  Secondly, by taking a normative stance, agents commit themselves
inferentially  to  the  valid  assumptions  that  compose  the  social  space  of  reasons.  As
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Brandom explains: “The significance of being committed to a certain claim or assertible
content  is  normative.  It  has  to  do  with  what  else  one  is  committed  or  entitled  to”
(Brandom 1994: 260). To put it otherwise, the normative implication of this conception of
language and understanding is that our linguistic capacities presuppose and rely upon a
normative  nature,  upon the  capacity  to  assume and maintain  in  the  face  of  others’
commitments  to  what  we  say  and  do,  and  that  this  normative  nature  is  from  the
beginning inter-subjective.
49 A second consequence of Brandom’s inferentialism for my understanding of normativity
is that if the meaning of the reasons for action (practical commitments) derives from
their  deontic  status  within  a  normative  social  practice,  the  meaning  of  actions
undertaken in the light of reasons so constituted derives from these reasons’ deontic
status within a given normative social practice in which other scorekeepers deal with
these reasons according to the game of deontic scorekeeping. The upshot of this point is
that  there  is  no  intelligibility  of  action  without  the  capacity  to  perceive  inferential
commitments, and to understand how other agents – scorekeepers – stand with respect to
the inferential commitments that relate to a given reason for action. Therefore: 
While the content of a practical commitment is thus partly specified in terms of the
normative pragmatic significance of the beliefs or claims (about rain, cruelty, etc.)
included in inferences which articulate part of the content of the commitment, it is
also specified by patterns of normative propriety that directly concern what we
ought and ought not to do to make that commitment true. (Levine 2012: 5) 
50 To  understand  someone’s  discourses  and  actions  means  grasping  what  they  commit
themselves to, that is to say, what is right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate for
them to say and to do. It means treating them as being committed or entitled to given
reasons or actions, which is to say, to treat them as a normative creature.
51 Whilst Brandom’s reduction of experience to language stands in the way of any practice-
based  and  society-centered  approach  like  that  which  concerns  me  here,  his
understanding of normative commitments is nevertheless an important achievement for
showing the pervasiveness of normative engagements at all levels of social life. In this
sense, we should see Brandom’s scorekeepers as truly normative creatures, in the sense
made  clear  by  Garfinkel’s  and  Goffman’s  accounts  of  the  dynamic  interplay  which
textures the social order of interaction.
 
Normativity-as-Governance
52 A second take on the idea of normativity as practice within the pragmatist tradition is
offered  by  the  practice-based  normative  theory  of  Frederick  L.  Will,  particularly  his
conception  of  normativity  as  “rational  governance  of  practices,”  with  its  paired
distinction between governance of practice and governance in practice. 17 According to
Will, governance is the main function accomplished by norms, and rational governance is
one of the ways through which governance is produced. Will’s distinction between what
he  calls  governance  in  practice  and  governance  of  practice  highlights  the  essential
continuity between reflexive and non-reflexive dimensions of normativity. On the one
hand,  governance  in  practice  refers  to  normative  practices  that  preside  over  the
regulated  functioning  of  a  given  practice  and  that  are  operated  by  the  controlled
application and use of existing standards and criteria. Governance in practice reflects the
fact that “governance is integral to the practices themselves” (Will 1981: 70-1), that a
practice is by definition a normatively organized type of order, so that the existence of
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normative criteria is a constituent part of practices themselves. But it refers, as well, to
the feedback effects that the functioning of a normative order produce upon the order
itself, bringing about constant change and adjustment according to the needs of action.
On the other hand, governance of practice refers to forms of governance which are more
directly  related  to  the  reflexive  dimension  of  practices.  It  denotes  these  normative
practices  by  which  a  normative  order  is  directly  addressed.  It  encompasses:  “those
processes by which the relations of coordination utilized in the governance of action are
instituted, annulled, or altered” (Will 1981: 71). Will sees normativity- as-governance as a
distributed feature of social life. Human beings are normative through and through, and
normative regulation is a mark of any social practice.
53 The  idea  that  Will  wishes  to  convey  through this  distinction  is  that,  as  the  central
category of normative theory, governance has priority over rationality. This stands in
contrast to most normative theories, which prioritize rational justification, regarded as
the quintessential  normative practice,  trumping any other practice having normative
import. Whereas Will understands rational justification as but one among plural forms of
governance, all having the same goal, which is the production of regulatory effects. 
54 Will uses the substantive form ‘governance’ rather than the verbal form ‘governing’ more
suggestive of direct action, because he believes that a central aspect of normativity – and
one  of  the  most  neglected  –  is  the  priority  of  maintenance  and  adjustment  over
justification and critique. Most governance activities tacitly unfold in the background,
without  much  notice,  as  activities  serving  stabilizing  and  regulative  functions.  They
usually go unnoticed unless something ‘goes wrong,’ that is, unless something occurs that
interrupts the regular functioning of a normative order or, even more disconcertingly,
entire areas of normative activity within the order become dysfunctional.
55 Will believes that normative orders arise out of the basic need for human communities to
stabilize their life in common. To this end, they develop structured patterns, a deep web
of  interlocking  forms  of  adjustment  activities  and  regularity  having  an  eminently
normative function that yields small but constant revisionary consequences in the order
it-self. It is through this flow of tiny but regular adjustments that the order generally
preserves its legitimacy.
56 In other words, Will is highlighting that norms and governance alike mostly function as
‘regular upkeep’ (the mostly tacit, mostly habitual and time-tested practice of tending to
the system), rather than being concerned with instituting new norms or justifying them
from scratch. Examples of regular, workaday activities of rational governance include:
“generation,  criticism,  refinements,  reconstruction,  maintenance,  reinforcement,  and
elimination”  (Will  1988:  43).  Normativity  in  the  broad  sense  just  described  (as  tacit
upkeep) encompasses every aspect of human life. Norms tacitly govern the whole of our
experience,  and governance is all-embracing.  That is why Will  argues that normative
reflection is an activity mostly concerned with adjustment and repair, unfolding in the
interstices, as it were, in the manifold connections between the need for action and the
answers or action worked out in response to such needs.
 
Conclusion
57 We  can  identify  at  least  four  main  themes  running  through  the  three  intellectual
traditions I have sketchily evoked: (a) the acknowledgment of the importance of tacit
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presuppositions  in  the  unfolding  of  social  practices;  (b)  the  priority  assigned  to
interaction or transaction as the central dimension of social life, and (c) the priority of
mutual dependence in the structuring of social order. Taken together, these themes give
shape to the idea of normativity as a shared and distributed property of the ordinary. The
historical references evoked in this paper show that none of these themes is really new.
Whilst the focus on tacit presuppositions has been a common feature of a large array of
20th century philosophies, and whilst social interaction has similarly been reclaimed by a
large spectrum of social theories, the third and the fourth theme have certainly been less
intensively exploited – at  least  in philosophy.  But the major philosophical  value this
project has to offer emerges from the joint consideration of these four conceptual factors
and  from  the  consequent  adoption  of  an  interdisciplinary  strategy  which  this
consideration requires. 
58 What then do all these approaches have in common? Indeed, each of them articulates, in
its own manner, the idea that normativity is embedded within everyday life as one of its
constitutive and irreducible traits. They articulate the idea that the human being is a
normative creature in the sense that a critical capacity for justification, critique, and
other  normative  practices  is  a  necessary  ingredient  of  our  human  constitution.  An
attitude  toward  accountability  is  built  into  the  fabric  of  social  life  as  a  necessary
precondition for the success of any form of social  intercourse,  from the most simple
forms  of  social  interaction  to  the  most  complex  forms  of  institutional  normative
governance. In this sense, the sources of normativity seem to lie in sociality rather than
in reason. Normativity is, so to speak, not only deeply social – a fact few would contest
today – but deeply embedded in the structure of ordinary life.
59 Consistent with this practice-based and society-centered approach, the sociological and
philosophical traditions I have evoked converge in showing that the central function of
normative practices is the maintenance, adjustment and reparation of normative orders
in the face of local challenges. If  we accept the general traits of this still  incomplete
account of the normative creature, we can find a way out of some of the recent difficulties
in  moral  and  political  philosophy.  A  pragmatic  approach  based  upon  a  widened
understanding of normativity can provide theoretically fruitful tools for setting up a new
agenda for understanding normativity. This approach (a) privileges the social over the
individual  as  the  primary  source  of normativity  (society-centered  approach),  (b)
acknowledges the normatively binding force of practices (practice-based approach), and
(c) relies upon empirical evidence to explain the functioning of normative practices in
ways much more sustained than have been done so far (multidisciplinary approach). 
60 Five conceptual traits mark the practice-based and society-centered approach. The first is
a focus upon the interplay of norms and actions which provides the methodological and
conceptual  framework  for  a  multidisciplinary  approach  engaging  human  and  social
sciences and philosophy on a non-reductionist basis. The second is the adoption of the
perspective of the situated agent in normative theory which is necessary to overcome the
shortcomings  of  reductive  (individualistic)  accounts.  The  third  is  the  definition  of
normative  practices  through  reference  to  their  regulative  function  in  the  dynamic
interplay of agents with environments. The fourth is that norms and values are defined in
accordance with a fallibilistic and experimental epistemology. The fifth is the priority
assigned to empirical over conceptual analysis and to the history of social processes over
the history of ideas in processes of critique and justification. The sixth is the priority of
non-ideal theory over ideal theory.
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61 All these assumptions, which will have to be worked out in greater detail, point toward an
understanding of normativity that is consistent with our grasp of ourselves as normative
creatures and that satisfies the epistemic requirements of a theory of normativity.
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NOTES
1. In  the  restricted  sense  in  which  I  will  discuss  normativity,  it  refers  to  the  regulation  of
conduct. Therefore, I will be concerned neither with epistemic nor with semantic normativity.
Epistemic normativity has to do with the conditions of validity of assertions dealing with states
of affairs, whereas semantic normativity deals with the conditions for the correct and incorrect
use  of  linguistic  expressions.  Practical  normativity  deals  with  the  ways  in  which  we  treat
ourselves and – especially – other human beings, and, by extension, what belongs to them, what
expresses their identity.
2. See Korsgaard 1996; Turner 2010; Rouse 2007; Brandom 1994.
3. My argument differs from that of Anne Rawls with which it only bears superficial resemblance.
Whilst I am interested too in a rapprochement between philosophy and the social sciences in the
study  of  normative  issues,  and  whilst  some  of  the  authors  we  mobilize  are  the  same,  my
argument does not build upon the distinction between constitutive and aggregate social order
and, symmetrically, has no use for John Rawls’ distinction between two concepts of rules (Rawls
1955), on which A. Rawls’ argument is built. For a complete discussion of this point, see Rawls
2009 and issue 9,  4,  2009 of  the Journal  of  Classical  Sociology,  edited by A.  Rawls  and entirely
devoted to this theme.
4. This paper expands a practice-based approach to normativity whose general framework I have
developed elsewhere. See in particular Frega 2014.
The Normative Structure of the Ordinary
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-1 | 2015
20
5. For an overview of a pragmatist account of normativity which emphasizes the resources of this
tradition’s founders, see Frega 2012.
6. For a sociological account of this distinction, see Rawls 2009 and Korbut 2014.
7. A conception still alive in Habermas’s conception of normativity. See notably Habermas 1993.
8. According  to  Garfinkel,  social  situations:  “are,  in  any  calculable  sense,  unknown;  in  their
actual  and  intended  logical  structures  are  essentially  vague;  and  are  modified,  elaborated,
extended, if not indeed created, by the fact and manner of being addressed” (Garfinkel 1967: 96).
It is this structural under-determination which imposes stringent normative expectations upon
members’ behaviour.
9. A  detailed  analysis  of  mutual  influences  between  the  works  of  Garfinkel  and  Goffman  is
provided by Rawls 2010.
10. Elsewhere, Goffman observes that: “participation in any contact with others is a commitment
[…]  an  involvement  in  the  face  of  others  that  is  as  immediate  and  spontaneous  as  the
involvement he has in his own face” (1967: 6).
11. While most interpreters tend to emphasise the constraining power of face work (e.g. Gamson
1985), it is important to note also its constitutive role in the production of the social bond, by
putting social interaction and mutual interdependence at the very root of social situation. Even if
we grant that “his first lesson is that all face-to-face interactions operate to restrain challenge”
(Gamson 1985: 610), we should also consider that face-to-face interactions operate in a way that
presupposes and instantiates a deeply reciprocal form of social interaction based upon mutual
accountability and shared responsibility for the successful furtherance of social life in the face of
its  intrinsic  and  irreducible  vulnerability.  Constraining  power,  vulnerability,  and  mutual
interdependence  are,  therefore,  three  distinct  but  inseparable  dimensions  of  the  normative
constitution of ordinary life, according to Goffman.
12. This is, in a certain sense, no surprise, as pragmatism, via G. H. Mead’s social psychology, the
Chicago School of sociology, and symbolic interactionism, has had an enduring influence upon
the sociological traditions here evoked. See Collins 1989.
13. The expression is Laugier’s, who employs it in an insightful article exploring the connections
between Austin’s  and Goffman’s approaches to the ordinary.  My reading of  Austin is  heavily
indebted to Laugier’s interpretation in Laugier 2009, and Laugier 2012.
14. See Rawls 2006 for an assessment of Garfinkel’s positioning with reference to pragmatism and
symbolic interactionism. See Collins 1989, Emirbayer 2010, and Quéré 2011 for a more positive
appreciation.  Among the rare philosophers having explored the philosophical  implications of
these approaches, it is notably within critical theory that the work of Garfinkel and Goffman
have had some influence. See in particular Habermas 1984, McCarthy 1996, and Celikates 2009.
15. Recent discussions of habit in the pragmatist tradition include Hartmann 2003, Kilpinen 2012,
and Sullivan 2006. See Camic 1986 for a historical appraisal of the place of the notion of habit in
sociology with reference to the pragmatist tradition and Schubert 2011 for a similar reading of
the notion of creativity. Joas 1996 is the standard reference for the analysis of creativity as a
central category of a pragmatist theory of action.
16. This also applies to reasons for action, see Brandom (1994: 229-42).
17. This vocabulary was introduced by Will in a series of articles published between 1981 and
1993. Will’s most relevant contributions to normative theory have been collected in Will 1997.
For a presentation of Will’s philosophical trajectory, see the editor’s introduction to that volume.
For an examination of Will’s theory of normativity, see Frega 2013.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper aims to develop a new understanding of normativity based upon the priority of the
ordinary. By relying upon diverse sociological and philosophical traditions, the paper seeks to
emphasize the ordinary tacit assumptions which provide the basic structure of our experience of
the  world  and  its  normative  features.  The  general  argument  is  that,  whereas  sociological
traditions  of  social  interactionism  shed  new  light  upon  the  “empirical  fact  of  normativity”,
ordinary language philosophy and pragmatism offer a theoretical account of normativity which
is consistent with the picture of normativity which emerges out of these empirical descriptions.
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